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Using Worker Participation and 
Buyouts to Save Jobs
I had been at Food Fair in 1979 when it closed, then 
joined as part-time at A&R I saw the writing on the wall 
as far as chains were concerned. a former A&P worker.
It was a tough period . . . you didn't know what the heck 
was happening before the lay-off, it was a bad time. Peo 
ple were bumping all over the place. Still, it was a big 
shock. January 31 and all of a sudden you're out of a job. 
There's nothing. At the time most everyone was gone 
other than high seniority people over 14 years. I don't 
think it really dawned on them that they were going to 
lose their jobs. We were in a store that was doing well, 
and didn't think it would close. a former A&P worker.
I closed three stores, kept bumping around. It was very, 
very sad, a lot of tears. It had been a very closeknit store, 
like a family. a former A&P worker.
It wouldn't make any difference if I never got the $5,000 
back. Just the experience was worth it. Here, you have a 
chance at possibly making some money, but also to have 
some control over your destiny. a worker/owner.
In late February 1982, during a national recession, the Great At 
lantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) announced, as required in its 
local union contract, that it was closing its 29 remaining Philadelphia 
supermarkets in 20 days (see table 1.1 for chronology). A&P had 
been closing Philadelphia area supermarkets gradually over the pre 
ceding decade, but closings had accelerated in the last months and 
the announcement of a complete shutdown of A&P's Philadelphia 
operations meant that suddenly 2,000 people would be thrown out of 
work.
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One of the affected unions, local 1357 of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW), was primed to respond. Less than a 
week after A&P announced the final store closings 20 days away, the 
union made a buyout proposal that eventually led to the establish 
ment of the O&O stores. The union originally proposed that A&P 
workers-to-be-laid-off purchase 21 of the closed stores. News got 
around among the A&P workers that there was an alternative to un 
employment or looking for another job, and meetings about the buy 
out plan began at the union hall. About 600 union members showed 
up for the initial meetings. Each potential worker/owner would have 
to contribute $5,000 and a $200 downpayment would hold a place. 
The union's credit union would make arrangements for loans. News 
paper accounts reported that about 600 workers signed pledges 
worth $3 million within the next three weeks.
New Relationships in the Workplace
During the past decade, a great deal of public attention has been 
paid to worker buyouts. To save their jobs, workers have contem 
plated or launched into buyouts of firms threatened with shutdowns. 
These firms range in size from the large 7,000-worker integrated 
National Steel Mill in Wen-ton, West Virginia to the two small A&P 
supermarkets in the Philadelphia area converted to O&O supermar 
kets with about 50 workers each. Worker buyouts have occurred in a 
variety of industries in addition to steel and supermarkets, including 
furniture, machine tools, frozen foods, mining, shoes, trucking, 
printing, meat packing, taxicabs, railroads, garments, and wood 
products. According to the records of the National Center for Em 
ployee Ownership (NCEO), about 60 firms threatened with shut 
down or massive layoffs have been bought by their employees since 
1975. Moreover, it appears that about 90 percent of these bought-out 
firms have survived thus far.
Employee ownership and worker cooperatives have a tradition 
stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century. Workers in recent 
years have rediscovered employee ownership in the midst of crisis
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and found for themselves a new way to work. Furthermore, the cur 
rent rediscovery has been occurring not only in the United States, 
but in most western industrial nations (Jones and Svejnar 1982).
The worker buyout is one path taken in the search for ways to 
change relationships between workers and their workplaces. Cur 
rently, various means of including workers in the ownership and con 
trol of work organizations are being explored. The most widespread 
forms are employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and quality of 
worklife (QWL) programs.
Quality of worklife is a vague term that means many things to 
many people. The kinds of activities it includes often take many 
other names too, such as "employee involvement."
[QWL] is used interchangeably with "humanization of 
work," "work reform," "work redesign," and "work 
improvement." It is too frequently used loosely to charac 
terize almost any joint [labor-management] program that 
requires a committee, but it ought to be confined to joint 
ventures that in the first instance aim at satisfying work 
ers' desires or needs for restructuring of the workplace. 
This restructuring should allow greater participation in 
decisionmaking on the job, constructive interaction with 
one's fellows, and opportunity for personal development 
and self-realization.
. . . All things considered, perhaps a sound enough 
guide to what QWL means is provided in a definition in 
cluded in a news report of an international conference that 
ended in Toronto in early September 1981: "many forms 
of new work organizations . . . involving workers in 
shop-floor decisions through problem-solving commit 
tees" (Siegel and Weinberg 1982, 140-142).
The General Accounting Office estimates that about 4,800 firms 
have ESOPs with various degrees of ownership in each (USGAO 
1986). A New York Stock Exchange study conducted in 1982 found 
that 14 percent of firms employing 500 or more people had quality 
circles, 13 percent had employee suggestion systems, 11 percent had 
employee task forces, 8 percent had profit sharing plans, and 8 per 
cent had labor-management committees. Overall, "one fourth [of
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corporations with 500 or more employees] have at least made a start 
toward the less-adversarial environment associated with QWL" 
(Freund and Epstein 1984, p. 129).
This trend toward experimentation has emerged for a number of 
loosely connected reasons. Structural changes in the economy have 
put pressure on manufacturing industries, on unions, and on the 
Frost Belt. The process of change has been exacerbated by corporate 
strategies that promote deindustrialization, by conglomerate merg 
ers, and by intensified foreign competition. Economic stagnation, 
deep and frequent recessions, and a recovery that left elevated un 
employment rates resulted in severe economic dislocation that is, 
massive layoffs and worsened structural unemployment.
At the same time, there have been institutional and cultural 
changes affecting workplaces. The quality of working life has be 
come a concern, not only of white-collar workers, but also of blue- 
collar employees. Participation by workers in decisionmaking has 
been lauded as a keystone of the Japanese economic achievement, as 
well as a necessary element for reversing declining labor productiv 
ity. Union-management relations have staggered from management 
hostility, union concessions, and union membership decline to union- 
management cooperation. In this confusing context, some workers 
have sought to take their job security into their own hands.
There are smaller numbers of worker buyouts compared to other 
forms of employee ownership and worker participation. Despite this, 
the drama of saving jobs, the mystery of rescuing seemingly failing 
firms, and the paradox of workers taking managerial responsibilities 
in worker buyouts have combined to fascinate both the popular and 
theoretical imagination. Aside from emotional appeal, however, 
worker buyouts seem to be more full-fledged attempts to implement 
employee ownership and worker participation. Observers of ESOPs 
often criticize them for giving workers mere paper ownership with 
out control (Slott, 1985a, 1985b). Meanwhile, critics of QWL pro 
grams distrust so-called participation without a genuine 
redistribution of power (Parker 1985). In theory, worker buyouts 
possess the potential to release workers' energies and to reforge the 
organization on a more effective and more egalitarian basis.
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Creation of Innovative Structures in Philadelphia Supermarkets
The buyout proposal and other union efforts spurred lengthy 
union-management negotiations between A&P and local 1357, which 
continued through the spring of 1982. In May, the UFCW and A&P 
agreed to a landmark contract which would save many jobs through 
the creation of two innovative business structures. First of all, two 
stores would be sold to groups of employees, who would indepen 
dently own and operate them as employee-owned businesses. The 
second innovation was Super Fresh, a new subsidiary of A&P, which 
would reopen many of the remaining stores. Super Fresh would in 
corporate new methods of management, a quality of worklife pro 
gram to provide employee participation in decisionmaking, and a 
revenue-based bonus plan as an incentive for workers. A&P prom 
ised to open 20 Super Fresh stores eventually and to give preference 
to former A&P workers in hiring. In exchange, the UFCW agreed to 
wage cuts of 20 percent and concessions on some benefits.
Even though announcement of plans for the employee-owned 
stores preceded the announcement of the Super Fresh plan, Super 
Fresh stores opened first. The first Super Fresh store opened in July 
1982. Super Fresh engaged consultants from the Busch Center at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania to establish the 
first QWL programs and to conduct the training of "associates" and 
"store directors" (the new terms for workers and store managers, 
respectively). Super Fresh stores were set up with a decentralized 
philosophy, so that the store director would have more autonomy 
than under A&P.
The information meetings on the worker buyout plan were held for 
a time, while union-A&P negotiations dragged on. After May, how 
ever, most workers dropped out of the buyout scheme, expecting to 
be recalled at Super Fresh.
The remaining prospective worker/owners met over the summer 
for planning and research. The first O&O store opened with 24 
worker/owners in Roslyn, Pennsylvania, a northwestern suburb of 
Philadelphia, on October 13, 1982 about seven months after the 
A&P shutdown announcement. The second O&O store, with 17
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(later reduced to 14) worker/owners, opened the following month in 
the far northeast section of Philadelphia, in a neighborhood called 
Parkwood Manor. Each O&O store established bylaws calling for 
substantial worker/owner control over a hired store manager.
This case of worker buyout, in contrast to many that have been 
reported in the news media, occurred in an urban context where a 
shutdown did not threaten the sole employment opportunity in town 
for displaced workers. The A&P workers found themselves out of a 
job at a time when the economy was slumping and employers all 
over the country were calling for union concessions. Even though 
these workers had slim prospects of finding a job with another su 
permarket chain, former A&P employees did have two options they 
could take to keep supermarket jobs. Eventually, 38 became worker/ 
owners in the two O&O supermarkets. Over 1,500 of the displaced 
A&P workers became Super Fresh employees.
As a result of the March 1982 shutdown, 29 A&P stores were 
actually closed. Twenty-six of these eventually became Super Fresh 
stores; two became O&O stores; and one was closed permanently 
because of structural flaws in the foundation.
The Super Fresh chain was later to convert all remaining A&P 
stores in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and north 
ern Delaware to the new subsidiary. Many were changed over by the 
end of 1982, and by mid-1983 there were over 50 Super Fresh stores 
in the region. These stores had been minimally affected by the shut 
down threat in 1982 and were represented by other UFCW union
____________Table 1.1 Chronology_________
Feb. 1982 A&P announcement of closings.
March 1982 UFCW proposes employee buyouts and holds meet 
ings to get pledges from workers.
May 1982 A&P/UFCW agreement to sell two stores to work 
ers, reopen most others as Super Fresh.
July 1982 First Super Fresh openings.
October 1982 First O&O store opens.
November 1982 Second O&O store opens._____________
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locals not actively seeking QWL or employee ownership and not en 
thusiastic about the agreement between local 1357 and A&P, to say 
the least. QWL training was not instituted as early nor was training 
conducted as fully as in the stores in Philadelphia, which had been 
involved in the shutdown. These employees had thus not participated 
in the discussions about employee ownership and QWL conducted by 
UFCW 1357 at the time of the shutdown.
The Study
Despite increasing openness by workers to the idea of buyouts and 
some apparent survivability of bought-out firms, little is actually 
known about the effectiveness of buyouts. That is, though jobs are 
saved, how do worker buyouts compare with other job saving meth 
ods? Do they generate new jobs or merely slow the onset of unem 
ployment? Do they open up new sources of organizational efficiency 
or survive through employee subsidies and painful sacrifices? Do 
they redistribute power in meaningful ways? Do they substitute one 
set of worries for another, financial risk for job insecurity?
This book looks at how worker buyouts function and how success 
fully they meet the goals of saving jobs and increasing worker con 
trol. It studies the two O&O supermarkets created from former A&P 
stores in Philadelphia in 1982 and compares the effectiveness of 
these buyouts to another method of job-saving labor-management 
concessions which included productivity bonuses and a QWL pro 
gram in the Super Fresh stores. Since both of these situations 
emerged from the same labor negotiations between A&P and locals 
56 and 1357 of the UFCW, the setting provides a natural field com 
parison and contrast. It allows for clear and controlled explorations 
of employee ownership and worker participation.
The research began when the shutdown was announced and 
UFCW local 1357 proposed worker buyouts. Members of a study 
group at Temple University investigating plant closings and job loss 
contacted UFCW locals 1357 (retail clerks) and 56 (meatcutters), 
A&P, and the consultants working with them and asked to study this
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experience. The research group conducting the overall study was 
multidisciplinary, drawn from the fields of industrial relations, orga 
nizational behavior, psychology, sociology, anthropology, urban stud 
ies, political science, and economics. The group drew upon many 
perspectives and methodologies in conducting the study. There were 
three major data collection phases, as shown in table 1.2.
This book covers results from Phases II and III. It is divided into 
eight chapters. First, here in chapter 1, we place worker buyouts in 
the context of employee ownership and worker participation, theoret 
ically, historically, and practically. In chapter 2, we present a theo 
retical framework of the organizational processes involved in 
employee-owned firms and the expected outcomes for organizations 
and individual workers. The framework will attempt to explain in 
theory how worker buyouts function and how they affect the organi 
zations' operations and the individuals in them. Chapter 3 presents 
the research design and methods of data collection used, namely 
semistructured interviews and systematic questionnaire surveys. In 
chapter 4, the formal structures of the O&O and Super Fresh stores 
are described. Chapter 5 reports data primarily from interviews con 
cerning the personal experiences of the workers and the informal so 
cial structures of the stores. Chapters 6 and 7 present quantitative 
tests of hypotheses derived from theoretical framework. Worker-level 
perceptions, attitudes, and economic outcomes are included in Chap 
ter 6. Store-level functioning and outcomes are examined in chapter
____________Table 1.2 Research Phases____________
July 1982 Phase I: Worker survey.
Summer 1983 Phase Ha: Interviews with O&O worker owners.
Fall 1983 Phase lib: Interviews with former A&P workers
at two Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia. 
Fall 1984 Phase He: Interviews with former A&P workers
in two Super Fresh stores outside Philadelphia. 
Fall 1984 Phase Ilia: Survey of workers interviewed in
Phase II. 
Winter to Summer 1985 Phase Illb: Shop steward and store manager
surveys.
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7. The final chapter, 8, draws conclusions and translates them into 
policy-relevant recommendations for future research and practice.
Varieties of Participative Firms and Buyouts
To understand the importance of the recent wave of worker buy 
outs, it is necessary to put them in historical, practical, and theoret 
ical focus. Where do these 60 or so firms fit? In particular, why 
study the case of the O&O Supermarkets? These buyouts are less 
well known than larger ones, such as Weirton Steel, South Bend 
Lathe, or Rath Packing. Moreover, the O&O stores are in a retail 
industry as contrasted with the more familiar and "typical" manu 
facturing buyout. However, the O&O case allows for the investiga 
tion of concerns of practitioners and theorists accumulated over the 
past decade which emphasize not only employee ownership but also 
worker control. Furthermore, the unique setting of the O&O case 
provides an unusually rich example of employee ownership and 
worker participation.
There are many types of employee ownership. The generic term, 
employee ownership, is used to refer to most forms of ownership by 
jobholders in a company, both workers and managers. Employee 
ownership is usually associated with the ESOP, only one of the many 
forms and hybrids that employee-owned firms take. The diversity of 
types is often highly confusing.
Two researchers have offered typologies of employee-owned firms 
in attempts to clarify the important similarities and differences 
among them. One typology depends primarily on the three legal 
forms in which employee ownership is found: ESOPs, direct em 
ployee ownership, and worker cooperatives (Toscano 1983b). The 
ESOP is defined in the tax code as a type of employee benefit pro 
gram which invests in its own company's stock and which is eligible 
for certain tax breaks. There are ESOPs with tiny amounts of stock 
in the company, such as at AT&T and Mobil, others with sub 
stantial stock, such as Eastern Airlines, still others with majority 
ownership, such as Rath, and a few with 100 percent ownership,
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such as Weirton Steel. ESOPs are often an indirect form of owner 
ship for workers because stocks are held in trust through an Em 
ployee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT) which may or may not be 
controlled by nonsupervisory employees. Some of these ESOPs re 
sulted from buyouts, but most did not. Worker buyouts number only 
about 1 percent of the estimated number of ESOPs.
Direct ownership is share ownership by workers without the legal 
and tax standing of an ESOP and without the indirect ownership de 
vice of the ESOT. Worker cooperatives, the oldest form of employee 
ownership, tend to involve equal share ownership and equal voice in 
management for all members or owners of the firm. The O&O stores 
were set up as worker cooperatives, but while all owners are work 
ers, not all workers are owners.
Each of the three forms has legal and operational advantages and 
disadvantages. Moreover, they each include so many variations that 
they often may not be operationally distinguishable. For instance, 
there are so-called democratic or cooperative ESOPs, which resem 
ble worker cooperatives in the distribution of ownership and control.
A second typology of employee-owned firms, developed in 
England, distinguishes employee-owned firms on the basis of the 
reasons for their origins (Cornforth 1983): (1) cooperatives 
"endowed" by the original capitalist owners, (2) worker buyouts, 
(3) defensive (job-saving) cooperatives, (4) alternatives (i.e., 
counter-cultural) cooperatives, and (5) job creation cooperatives us 
ing government money to combat high unemployment. Because this 
typology was derived in England, it ignores ESOPs, which form a 
large group here, but were virtually absent in the U.K. in the early 
1980s.
More important, though reasons for establishment may be classi 
fiable, firms in a particular category do not inevitably have similar 
characteristics or objectives. As Blasi and Whyte (1981) have 
pointed out, while job-saving worker buyouts in the 1970s and 1980s 
are similar in origin, they differ in key characteristics and behaviors. 
In the 1970s buyouts, unions were either hostile or passive and 
rarely was management structure changed. In contrast, in 1980s buy-
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outs, unions took initiatives to shape the terms, and workers have 
sought and obtained more say in the firms' day to day operations.
While legal forms and origins are important, they tend to reflect 
historical and legal trends and do not clarify how different organiza 
tions function. A more precise typology is necessary.
For theoretical and practical importance there seem to be two 
main dimensions. These are (1) the amount of employee ownership in 
the firm and (2) the degree of worker participation in decisions 
about policies and day to day management. These dimensions are 
complex and not easily reducible to quantitative scales. Amount of 
employee ownership should take into account not only the percentage 
of equity owned by employees, but also the distribution of shares 
among owners, the dispersion of shares among employees, and the 
percent of equity owned by managers compared to that owned by 
nonsupervisory employees (Conte, Tannenbaum and McCulloch 
1981). Likewise, degree of worker participation is actually multidi 
mensional, involving the degree of worker influence, the range of 
decisions influenced, the extent of participation among workers, 
whether participation is direct or representative, and other aspects 
(Dachler and Wilpert 1978).
Some rough subdivision of these dimensions does allow us to 
make meaningful distinctions among categories of employee-owned 
and worker-participative firms. The following table (1.3) splits 
amount of employee ownership into three segments: no employee 
ownership, minority employee ownership (employees own less than 
50 percent of the shares), and majority employee ownership (more 
than 50 percent of the workers own more than 50 percent of the 
shares). The other main dimension is dichotomized into low worker 
participation and high worker participation. High worker participa 
tion involves such things as (a) restructured hierarchy and control 
systems, changed role of supervisors, worker input to decisions; (b) 
worker representatives on the board of directors and/or on the ESOT, 
worker voting rights on shares; and (c) union involvement in collec 
tively bargaining for the ownership and/or participation plans, pro 
moting the plan, and seeking a changed role for workers and/or the
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union. Low worker participation means workers and unions have not 
been involved in these issues. Table 1.3 illustrates this typology.
Though some of these categories are self-explanatory, others are 
not. The first two categories involve garden-variety capitalist firms 
and are included here for contrast with forms of employee owner 
ship. (1) Conventional firms, probably the largest category, includes 
those with no employee ownership and minimal worker participa 
tion. (2) Firms with QWL or other participatory programs, but with 
no employee ownership belong to an apparently growing group. 
Some well-known examples include Ford Motor with its El (Em 
ployee Involvement) programs developed in cooperation with the 
United Auto Workers (UAW), General Foods with its Topeka pet 
food plant, and, one of the subjects of this study, Super Fresh Food 
Markets.
The remaining four categories comprise the forms usually lumped 
indiscriminately together and called employee ownership. (3) Most 
ESOPs involve a minority of company equity and minimal worker 
participation. According to a survey by Marsh and McAllister (1981) 
of ESOPs of at least three years of age, only 13 percent held greater 
than 50 percent of company stock, the average ESOP holding being 
28 percent. Moreover, the survey found that 69 percent of ESOPs 
granted no voting rights on the stock plan participants, and that 
more than one-half of ESOP companies report no effects of the 
ESOP on worker-management communications, cooperation among 
employees, or employee suggestions. Furthermore, the chief motives
Table 1.3 Typology of Employee Ownership and Worker Participation 
________________Amount of employee ownership______ 
____________None______Minority_____Majority
(2) QWL and (4) Concessionary (6) Worker co-ops 
High participation buy-ins and worker 
Degree of programs buyouts 
worker
participation Low (1) Conventional (3) Most ESOPs (5) Employee/ 
firms manager
buyouts
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for adoption of ESOPs were, in rank order, providing an employee 
benefit, increasing productivity, and taking advantage of available 
tax breaks. (4) Concessionary buy-ins form a relatively small cate 
gory, though an important one, and are particularly a product of the 
1981-83 recession and its aftermath. Companies in which workers 
and unions have given wage concessions in return for company stock 
and, in some cases, seats on the board of directors include Pan 
American Airways (including the Airline Pilots Association, known 
as ALPA), Eastern Airlines (including a number of unions, such as 
International Association of Machinists [IAM], ALPA, and others), 
Chrysler (with UAW), and Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) 
(including a number of railway unions). This category, the subject 
of heated debate in labor circles (e.g., Metzgar 1984; Compa and 
Baicich 1984a, 1984b; Barber and Banks 1984) has never been 
identified as a special subtype of employee ownership, though it is 
neither a typical ESOP nor a full-fledged buyout.
The final two categories, (5) the employee/manager buyout and 
(6) the worker buyout have also not been distinguished before. In 
this study, the term employee/manager buyout implies majority em 
ployee ownership with conventional management control. Such firms 
include those turned over by idealistic owners ("endowed coopera 
tives' ' from Cornforth 1983) and those bought by both managers and 
workers, with stock distribution weighted toward higher-paid man 
agement employees. Often these employee/manager buyouts are 
structured as ESOPs, but almost always control of the stock is in the 
hands of the manager group and/or the financiers of the deal, and the 
typically hierarchical authority structure of the firm is unchanged. 
Employee/manager buyouts tend to conform to what Blasi and 
Whyte (1981) called "1970s buyouts." They include such firms as 
South Bend Lathe (with the cooperation of a United Steelworkers 
local union), Bates Fabrics, and Dan River Textiles.
In contrast is category (6), worker cooperatives and worker buy 
outs. These firms involve both majority employee ownership and 
high levels of participation in decisions by management, workers, 
and/or unions. Older cooperatives include the plywood firms of the 
Pacific northwest (Berman 1967). Relatively new worker coopera-
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tives include numerous countercultural organizations (Rothschild- 
Whitt 1979). The buyouts tend to be of the "1980s variety" (Blasi 
and Whyte 1981) with union involvement and attempts at restructur 
ing the hierarchy. The O&O supermarkets, the main focus of this 
study, fit into this final category.
In sum, the six categories outline different types of firms with 
differing qualities based on the amount of employee ownership and 
worker participation they contain. We expect that the goals they set, 
the methods they use, the problems they face, the solutions they de 
vise, and the effectiveness which results may differ fundamentally 
from one category to the next. For instance, the expectations of 
workers concerning their input to decisions may depend on the de 
gree of employee ownership, such that levels of input adequate in a 
QWL program may be frustrating to those in worker buyouts. Simi 
larly, motivation and productivity gains in ESOPs may be related 
more to stock prices than they would be in worker cooperatives 
where independence from managerial control may be more impor 
tant.
The focus of this study, worker buyouts, has broad significance, 
despite its narrow focus on few firms. Worker buyouts are one of the 
most theoretically interesting forms of participation. Workers and 
unions seem to have noticed limitations of previous cases which in 
cluded less ownership and participation, and recent establishment of 
concessionary buy-ins shows the tendency to mix ownership with 
participation. Future buyouts and buy-ins may continue these pat 
terns. Along with our focus on worker buyouts, we compare the 
O&O stores to Super Fresh Stores, some of which have implemented 
QWL. Thus, we can compare employee ownership with participation 
to participation alone. This enables us to see more clearly the rela 
tive effectiveness of worker buyouts.
Past and Recent History of Employee Ownership
The various forms of employee ownership have had a long history 
in the United States dating back to the 1790s in the case of worker
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cooperatives and to the 1920s in the case of ESOPs. Employee own 
ership did not always enjoy as much notice or as much success as in 
the last few decades. In fact, this history has often been used to 
criticize employee ownership. Lessons can be learned from past ex 
perience on the importance of cooperatives and ESOPs within past 
labor-capital wars, on employee ownership's feasibility and viability 
in the present, and on its likely place in the future. The prevailing 
wisdom, according to critics, claims that:
(1) worker cooperatives failed as an anticapitalist labor 
strategy;
(2) worker cooperatives are doomed to sink as socialist 
islands in the capitalist sea or as anarchic and undis 
ciplined, hence inefficient, businesses;
(3) ESOPs are historic manifestations of management 
hostility to unions;
(4) employee ownership is a sidetrack from either conven 
tional collective bargaining or from "Theory Z" type 
corporate human relations policies;
(5) at best, worker buyouts are moderators of structural 
economic dislocation, and at worst, they are a stick of 
financial burden attached to a paper carrot of stock 
ownership.
Without denying the validity of criticisms of many aspects of past 
performance and practice, it is possible to see recent experience with 
employee ownership as a break from the past. While some motives 
for establishing worker cooperatives and ESOPs have remained con 
stant, the ideological, economic, institutional, and legal environ 
ments have shifted. Thus, employee ownership need not be heavily 
tarred with the brush of past failure and past criticism.
Two separate streams (at times, trickles) of development of 
worker cooperatives and of ESOPs have been joined at the contem 
porary wave of employee ownership. They had quite different ori 
gins: worker cooperatives in the early labor movement of the mid- 
nineteenth century; ESOPs in the antiunion welfare capitalism of the 
1920s.
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Worker Cooperatives
Since the 1830s, workers have formed cooperatives during strikes, 
lockouts, and depressions. Some histories trace them back to the 
1790s (Jones 1984; Curl 1980). Early cooperatives were also part of 
"alternative" or socialist movements, including those stimulated by 
the thoughts of men like Robert Owen and Horace Greeley and by 
Communitarian settlements like Brook Farm. By the 1860s, they had 
become an integral part of the platform of the short-lived National 
Labor Union (NLU) led by William Sylvis. Sylvis and the NLU 
helped found a number of worker cooperatives, but these soon began 
to fail or be dominated by a few worker/shareholders or outsiders. 
Subsequent labor organizations, such as the Knights of Labor 
(KOL), continued to promote cooperatives as the solution to indus 
trial conflict between labor and capital. In fact, Jones (1984) credits 
the KOL with establishing about 200 worker cooperatives in the 
1880s at the height of that union's influence. The next large wave 
took place in the 1930s, when unemployed workers formed "self- 
help" cooperatives during the Great Depression.
As the American Federation of Labor (AFL) gained hegemony 
over the U.S. labor movement in the late nineteenth century, how 
ever, its leaders turned toward collective bargaining through business 
unionism and disdained worker cooperatives as impractical. Worker 
cooperatives became dissociated from the labor movement. Further 
more, as observers and theorists of the labor movement emerged in 
middle-class intellectual circles, critiques of worker cooperatives 
and defense of collective bargaining buttressed the AFL's case. John 
Commons in the U.S. (Derber 1970) and Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
(1920), Fabian Socialists in Great Britain, discredited worker coop 
eratives as inevitably unstable forms of organization, and as inferior 
to collective bargaining in promoting equality of power between la 
bor and capital.
Were the labor officials and intellectuals correct in their pessi 
mism? The verdict on worker cooperatives by subsequent observers 
has frequently been just as negative (Shirom 1972). Generally, 
worker cooperatives have been found to be difficult to organize,
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undercapitalized, concentrated in craft industries and/or those 
threatened by structural and technological changes, handicapped by 
weak management and weak commitment to cooperative ideals, be 
set by hostility from business and labor, and short-lived (Aldrich and 
Stern 1983). However, recent studies by Jones (1984) have shown the 
record of worker cooperatives not to be "as overwhelmingly bleak 
as some critics contend" (p. 51). Worker cooperatives with the most 
cooperative features (i.e., equal share ownership, work requirements 
for members, and participation in decisionmaking) have had the best 
success in viability, longevity, and integrity of democratic gover 
nance structure, Jones finds.
Nevertheless, worker cooperatives have never been more than a 
marginal economic force. Currently, some of them are important in a 
few industries, for example, high grade plywood manufacture in the 
Pacific northwest or refuse collection in the San Francisco Bay area 
(Perry 1978). However, for the largest number of currently existing 
cooperatives, those formed out of the social upheavals of the 1960s 
and 1970s, economic marginality is a fact. Jackall and Grain (1984) 
estimate that in 1980 approximately 1,000 small worker cooperatives 
existed. The origins of these firms seem to be motivated mainly by 
opposition to corporate America and a desire to create alternative 
institutions. Most operate in the service sector, food production, dis 
tribution, and sales, with very few in manufacturing, primarily in 
printing and publishing. These cooperatives are small, with about 10 
members on average and about $200,000 in sales per year. Their 
worker/owners are young, educated, white, and low-paid. Indeed, 
until the recent wave of interest in employee/manager and worker 
buyouts, even sympathetic observers of worker cooperatives deemed 
them anachronistic, idealistic, and/or marginal.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
At about the same time the labor movement cut its ties with the 
employee ownership movement, capitalists and managers became in 
terested in stock ownership for workers. In the 1870s, Abram
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Hewitt, then congressman and later mayor of New York City, advo 
cated worker stock ownership and profit sharing as the solution to 
industrial evils (Derber 1970). In fact, Patard (1982) traces the roots 
of the idea back to the 1840s. However, it was not until the post- 
World War I period that employee stock ownership flourished, 
through employer-initiated savings plans, stock purchase options, 
profit sharing, and employee benefit plans. Patard describes the em 
ployee stock ownership movement of the 1920s as bigger in propor 
tion to the number of shares outstanding than the contemporary 
ESOP movement in 1980. Employee stock ownership was often pro 
moted by management in connection with employer-dominated com 
pany unions. Unionists and leftists denounced these plans as union- 
busting, co-optation devices, giving workers big financial risks 
without any genuine participation in decisions. The stock market 
crash of 1929 destroyed and discredited this movement. Subsequent 
stock ownership plans tended to be limited to highly-paid executives.
In the 1950s, a visionary investment banker, Louis Kelso, took up 
the banner of employee stock ownership in the Capitalist Manifesto 
(Kelso and Adler 1958) and in his Two Factor Theory (Kelso and 
Hetter 1967). Despite sharp critiques of his theories by eminent 
economists, Kelso was persistent in promoting his views. His efforts 
and those of his students, associates, and converts to his ideas have 
created the contemporary ESOP movement. Kelso's pragmatic thrust 
has been to take advantage of features in the Internal Revenue Code 
that allow qualified employee benefit trusts to borrow money to buy 
the employer's stocks or other securities. Kelso hailed ESOPs as an 
instrument of corporate finance, of hostile takeover prevention, of 
wealth redistribution, of productivity improvement, and a number of 
other boons to capitalists, workers and the economy in general.
ESOPs have been enhanced by virtually every federal tax change 
since the early 1970s. 1 The Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 drew in 
creased attention to the tax benefits to corporations of establishing 
ESOPs. Kelso's chief convert in Congress and the most powerful and 
active proponent of ESOPs has been Senator Russell Long (D., La.),
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son of Louisiana's late populist governor, Huey Long. Sen. Long 
was the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in the 1970s and 
was the committee's ranking Democrat until his retirement in 1986.
Under ESOPs employers establish ESOTs for their employees to 
give or sell stock in their own company as a benefit, somewhat sim 
ilar to a pension fund. Tax breaks to the employer issue from this 
transaction; for instance, social security tax is not paid on contribu 
tions to the trust, employer contributions are tax deductible, and a 
tax credit might be claimed as well. Employees get a tax-exempt 
benefit and receive vested stock when they leave the firm. The 
ESOT can borrow money to purchase stock and use the employer's 
contribution to pay off the loan. The ESOP particularly attracts 
employers because of its usefulness to: (a) raise investment capital; 
(b) pass a company on to employees; and (c) provide a special type 
of pension plan, exempt from several important ERISA protections. 
However, for workers the ESOP is generally not seen as a suitable 
substitute for a fully protected pension plan.
Business journals emphasize the advantage to management of al 
lowing employee ownership: quick capital formation, tax breaks, 
avoidance of pension fund obligations, union avoidance, improved 
worker motivation and discipline, etc. Fears of management manip 
ulation of ESOPs and of lack of worker control over stock voting 
rights have led many unionists to be very wary of employee owner 
ship.
While then: primary appeal has been to employers, ESOPs have 
sometimes been used to effect employee/manager and worker buy 
outs. The first such employee/manager buyout using an ESOP for job 
saving occurred at South Bend Lathe in 1975. Despite the predomi 
nance of management control, ESOPs have been used by some 
unions to gain a say in management decisions through concessionary 
buy-ins. In fact, the rise of the ESOP seems to have revived the idea 
of spreading stock ownership or making workers into capitalists. 
Ironically, the rise of the ESOP may have helped to resuscitate labor 
movement interest in employee ownership. In addition, the worker 
cooperative movement has been transformed by lessons learned in
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employee/manager buyouts those which granted little control to 
workers or unions.
Current Environment of Employee Ownership
The growth of interest in employee ownership has been stimulated 
by other factors in addition to legislative benevolence to ESOPs. So 
cietal changes over the last few decades also motivate the study and 
practice of employee ownership. These changes reflect popular ide 
ology, the economy, legislative approaches to current problems, and 
institutional rearrangements.
Ideology
Ideological currents in politics, business, and interpersonal rela 
tions in the western industrial nations may be said to have contrib 
uted to a desire for powersharing. Sandwiched in with movements 
such as decentralization and accountability in government and self- 
determination through feminism, since the early 1970s there has 
been a drive for greater worker participation in decisionmaking. The 
Lordstown strike and the book Work in America (1973) led to calls 
for job enrichment and the humanization of work. The rising aware 
ness of foreign competition has given long tenures on the best seller 
list to books advocating forms of corporate powersharing, such as 
Theory Z (Ouchi 1981) and In Search of Excellence (Peters and Wa 
terman 1982). Academic interest in powersharing at work has also 
been stirred by examination of socialist alternatives to Soviet bureau 
cratic centralism, most notably by the Yugoslav system of self- 
managed enterprises. The Solidarity union in Poland renewed this 
interest through placing self-management high on its now-repressed 
agenda of societal change. Although it has been considered quite 
radical at times, the concern for powersharing has pushed into many 
areas of the mainstream and lends legitimacy to forms of worker 
participation and ownership. Even the wave of conservative ideology 
resulting in the Reagan presidency stressed self-help and en- 
trepreneurship, which have been used to justify employee ownership.
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Economics
Economic changes, particularly structural ones, have given the 
greatest impetus to both worker participation and employee owner 
ship. Several forces have combined to shut down many workplaces, 
to force millions to the unemployment lines, and to change the 
power balance between labor and capital. The conglomerate merger 
movement from the late 1960s to the present, together with corpo 
rate disinvestment policies, and deindustrialization closed factories, 
offices, and stores that had become unprofitable or not profitable 
enough for corporate financial analysts (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982). Population migration to the Sun Belt, the shift of employment 
from manufacturing to so-called postindustrial sectors, and a rapid 
series of recessions compounded the economic dislocation. Business 
sought solutions for its decline in competitiveness and productivity, 
taking advantage of unions' political and economic weaknesses. 
Management initiated QWL and participative programs and bar 
gained for labor concessions.
Many workers faced with these pressures and the loss of job secu 
rity had to come up with new coping responses. Some accepted con 
cessionary buy-ins, while some others engaged in employee/manager 
and worker buyouts.
International Developments
Workers in other countries pursued similar paths as well. In West 
ern Europe, interest in employee ownership as an answer to reces 
sion and unemployment grew. Employee-owned companies more 
than doubled in number in both Great Britain and France between 
1975 and 1983. In 1983, the Wales Trade Unions Congress (TUC) 
made employee ownership an integral part of its overall strategy for 
Welsh economic recovery. In Italy, the number of employee-owned 
firms topped 18,000 by 1981, ranging in size from tiny firms to 
those employing thousands of workers. Most of these firms belong to 
cooperative leagues affiliated with the major trade union federations. 
Increasing numbers of worker cooperatives have arisen in Holland,
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Belgium, and Denmark, too. Finally, Spain boasts a rapidly growing 
employee-owned sector, including the famed Mondragon coopera 
tives of the Basque country, employing over 18,000 in more than 85 
employee-owned firms. The Mondragon cooperatives are extremely 
well-integrated, featuring their own central bank, a technical univer 
sity, and the largest manufacturer/exporter of household appliances 
in Spain (EEC 1981).
Employee ownership took on an entirely new meaning in Sweden 
and Denmark during the 1970s and 1980s. The Social Democratic 
parties of those nations proposed a series of plans for "economic 
democracy," in which ownership of private sector firms would, over 
a few decades, pass over to union and/or worker control through ac 
cumulated employer contributions to "wage-earner funds." Al 
though these proposals were stalled and watered down in the 
Scandinavian parliaments, this idea of employee ownership is part of 
a much larger tendency in northern European countries toward 
worker participation and co-determination.
Legislation
The movement towards expanded employee ownership in the U.S. 
has also gained momentum from a variety of legislative initiatives. 
Aside from the various changes in the tax code over the years that 
favor the formation of ESOPs, attempts to aid communities dis 
tressed by unemployment, shutdowns, and poverty have increased 
awareness of the opportunities for employee ownership. For in 
stance, legislation was introduced in a number of states, several cit 
ies (including Philadelphia), and Congress over the past decade to 
mitigate the impact of plant closings. Though these bills primarily 
focused on prenotification of layoffs and shutdowns, most also in 
cluded provisions to encourage employee/manager and worker buy 
outs. Arguments used by advocates of plant closing legislation often 
emphasized that a minimum of six months prenotification was nec 
essary if a buyout was even to be contemplated.
On another front, Congress established in 1979 a National Con 
sumer Cooperative Bank, which can reserve up to 10 percent of its
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funds to aid worker cooperatives, employee/manager and worker 
buyouts, and even ESOPs. The Economic Development Administra 
tion (EDA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the 
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), among other agencies, have 
been involved in assisting employee-owned firms, particularly 
through buyouts. Their involvement stems from either broad inter 
pretations of their legal mandates or explicit mandates to work with 
employee-owned firms. Innumerable state and local initiatives and 
agencies have directed attention, money, and other aid to employee 
ownership. Recently, Massachusetts passed a new worker coopera 
tive statute that aids in the formation of democratically-owned and 
operated businesses.
In Pennsylvania, an Employee Ownership Assistance Program was 
established by a state statute in June 1984. The act provided for a 
fund of $15 million to be used over a three-year period: (a) $1 mil 
lion per year was set aside for technical assistance and professional 
services, including the funding of feasibility studies. It was initially 
set up as a "forgivable" loan program, but this later became a grant 
program with the requirement that 10 percent of the grant be 
matched by some other source, (b) $4 million per year was devoted 
to a revolving loan fund for debt financing (or for "gap" equity 
loans while worker/owner investors came up with their own personal 
contributions).2
Support Networks
The establishment of a developing network of support organiza 
tions to advance, encourage, and aid employee ownership demon 
strates an important institutional shift from the past. The legislation 
passed in Massachusetts was drafted by staffers of the Industrial Co 
operative Association (ICA) of Somerville, Massachusetts. The ICA 
is one of a growing number of institutions that have sprung up in the 
past decade to support the employee ownership movement. In the 
past, employee-owned firms often operated in total isolation. Now, 
organizations such as ICA, the Philadelphia Association for Cooper 
ative Enterprise (PACE),3 the O&O Investment Fund, and the North
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Carolina Center for Community Self-Help give several types of tech 
nical and financial assistance to worker cooperatives, buyouts, and 
new start-ups. Educational and advocacy organizations like the Na 
tional Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), the Employee Stock 
Ownership Association, and the Association for Workplace Democ 
racy (AWD) encourage, conduct, and publish research, disseminate 
information, and even lobby the government (in the case of the 
ESOP Association) to promote employee ownership.
Furthermore, in colleges and universities, ongoing research, edu 
cation, and training have led to established centers of expertise on 
employee ownership at such places as Cornell University, Boston 
College, the University of Michigan, Brigham Young University, 
Stanford University, Guilford College, and Temple University, 
among others. While the support network is growing, it is still quite 
loose. Thus far, no superstructure has been able to knit together the 
diverse, disparate, and dispersed set of employee-owned firms.
Considerations in Establishing Worker Buyouts
Despite a few cases that have achieved major media attention, ac 
tual experience with worker buyouts is limited. As stated earlier, 
about 60 firms have undergone employee/manager or worker buy 
outs, and most have survived. Yet no one knows in how many cases 
buyouts were contemplated but never started or were proposed but 
never consummated. Many potentially interested participants may 
have been deterred by lack of knowledge, by fears, by lack of lead 
ership, or by discovering that their dreams could not be transformed 
into workable plans. It may be useful here to briefly outline some 
issues respecting the forms, feasibility, and union-management rela 
tions of worker and employee/manager buyouts in order to under 
stand some of the stumbling blocks.
There are two main legal forms, the worker cooperative and the 
ESOP. In a traditional worker cooperative, each member invests an 
equal amount of money, which forms the basis of the firm's capital.
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In traditional cooperatives, a major problem can be that as the value 
of the company rises, the value of individual shares rises, too. After 
a while, success can be a golden handcuff. If share values rise too 
high for potential new members to afford, this may lead to hiring of 
nonowning workers or selling out to a larger, capitalist firm. These 
problems occurred in the San Francisco Bay scavenger firms and 
also in the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific northwest. However, 
recently ICA and PACE developed a new model of worker coopera 
tives based on the experience of the Mondragon cooperatives in 
Spain. ICA's model of worker cooperatives gets around this problem 
by drastically lowering the cost to be a member (to about $100). 
Members have equal voting rights, and they share in the profits. But 
the members' profit shares are distributed, not in the form of stock, 
but to what are called "internal savings accounts," which operate 
like internal pension funds.
The ESOP form provides a clear model of employee ownership 
that gives substantial incentives to employers for agreeing to a buy 
out. Probably the major advantage of the ESOP, especially when 
compared to the typical cooperative, is its flexibility. This flexibility 
involves several important issues: who buys stock; the distribution of 
ownership; the degree of overall employee ownership; financing; and 
the rights and privileges of ownership. However, the flexibility re 
flects vagueness and also leaves the ESOP form open to manipula 
tion. The popularity of the ESOP in buyouts, particularly in what 
we call employee/manager buyouts, leaves unionists skeptical of its 
advantages.
There has been a trend, as workers and unions gain experience, to 
combine many of the advantages of the two main forms of employee 
ownership into a hybrid form. Olson (1982) calls these cooperative 
ESOPs. These hybrids take the major feature of worker cooperatives, 
commitment to democratic control, and join it to the major feature of 
ESOPs, flexibility in financing and taxation. Creatively structured 
cooperative ESOPs have been initiated at Rath Packing, Hyatt- 
Clark, and Atlas Chain. These worker buyouts provide for worker 
control over management through democratically structured, one- 
member-ohe-vote ESOPs. The cooperative ESOP owes its genesis to
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the active involvement of local unions, which fought to protect 
worker interests and to avoid serious pitfalls of previous efforts, such 
as South Bend Lathe, which the worker/owners struck in 1980, and 
Vermont Asbestos Group, where worker/owners> disgruntled over 
lack of worker input into decisions, sold a controlling interest to a 
businessman. However, it has proven difficult to convert firms to this 
new form because of problems in sustaining cooperative involvement 
by workers and managers in struggling firms.
In general, would we expect employee ownership to be a feasible 
path to save jobs? Or, as some critics claim, are plant closure buy 
outs examples of "lemon capitalism" for workers? If the corporate 
owner cannot make it, why should anyone expect the worker/owners, 
lacking entrepreneurial experience and expertise, to revive dead 
firms? Questions about the viability of employee/owned firms worry 
even those predisposed to favor them.
The "lemon capitalism" argument implies that plant closings are 
caused by the inescapable, invisible hand of market forces. That is, 
competition, technological change, population shifts, educational ex 
pansion, cultural upheaval, and other such seemingly impersonal 
forces cause the closure. And if workers buy it out to save jobs, they 
are just swimming against the tide.
This is the conventional wisdom of yesteryear, which has been 
overturned by observation of companies closing profitable plants 
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Whyte 1984). Such was the case of 
the O&O supermarkets in Philadelphia. A&P threatened to shut 
down all its stores in the region (and many others in other regions) to 
satisfy its corporate goals, not because each store was unprofitable. 
Furthermore, there are numerous plants threatened with shutdown 
that could in theory be profitable if some of their operating proce 
dures were changed instead of closing them.
Not every plant closing is an appropriate target for employee own 
ership, however. Successful buyouts have several characteristics: 
good timing, planning, adequate resources, technical assistance, and 
organization, as well as luck (Stern and Hammer 1978). The key 
element is an objective feasibility study, or as Woodworth (1982a) 
puts it, "a cold, hard look at the facts." Virtually all of the success-
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ful employee/manager and worker buyouts involved one or more fea 
sibility studies.
In addition to these elements, successful worker and employee/ 
manager buyouts have good sources of finance, a governance struc 
ture involving workers, competent management, and increasingly, 
union support. Adequate financing is crucial, for many failures of 
employee-owned firms, particularly in the nineteenth century, have 
been traced to undercapitalization. The governance structure may as 
sume greater operational importance only after the buyout is estab 
lished.
Managerial expertise can be a problem, but is not an inevitable 
one. Most researchers agree that managerial expertise is crucial, and 
sometimes it is hard to recruit or keep. However, as Long (1978a) 
reported, managers in one employee/manager buyout were more 
likely to cite advantages than disadvantages for themselves. Advan 
tages included greater worker input in decisions, greater worker in 
terest in doing a good job, and better cooperation between workers 
and managers. Disadvantages for managers included workers overrat 
ing their importance and demanding too much say, loss of manage 
rial authority, and managers needing to work harder and perform 
better under employee ownership. As Bellas (1972) noted in a study 
of worker cooperatives: "The manager must be an educator and a 
motivator, knowing full well that his autonomy will diminish as he 
increases the capability of his employees.''
Unions have been skeptical about employee ownership. Some 
commentators see no role for unions once workers are owners. How 
ever, others believe the role of the union will be preserved and made 
easier through reduced labor-management conflict. In practice, the 
impact on collective bargaining is mixed, but there is still a signifi 
cant and necessary role for the union at employee-owned companies 
(Sockell 1982; Stern and O'Brien 1977; Hochner 1983a, 1983b). 
Where unions take leading roles to facilitate the buyout, they often 
push for participative changes in management and organizational 
culture. This may require them to take on new roles and question 
some traditional values, as well as to learn how to run and finance 
businesses. These new roles require education.
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Employee Ownership's Role in Policy
The potential uses of employee ownership are many, according to 
its advocates. Overall, there is much to be found in employee own 
ership for those of all political stripes. While the implications of our 
particular findings for policy will be elaborated in the final chapter, 
a brief general picture of some potential goals for worker buyouts 
can be given here.
Three overall sets of goals can be identified in increasing order of 
scope (or grandiosity). First, worker buyouts can be used to save 
jobs threatened by structural unemployment and by corporate strate 
gic shifts. As Bradley and Gelb (1983) point out, one of the main 
thrusts of buyouts has been to moderate the velocity of economic 
change and decline of certain industries. Buyouts not only help 
workers avoid the pain of job loss, but also have other ameliorative 
functions. Communities can be spared sudden ruptures in their social 
and economic fabric and can encourage buyouts as a way to preserve 
other local business and the taxbase.
Second, from broader perspective, buyouts and employee owner 
ship may support a strategy of economic decentralization. Employee 
ownership and ESOPs have been perceived as tools for achieving a 
number of political and social goals, such as (1) spreading ownership 
in the face of increased economic concentration of power (e.g., U.S. 
Joint Economic Committee 1975); (2) shifting responsibility for deal 
ing with economic dislocation to private initiatives; (3) providing al 
ternatives to government welfare policies and nationalization 
strategies; (4) opening up options for the development and preserva 
tion of a strong small business sector; and (5) leading to some type 
of radical restructuring and democratizing of the economy, i.e., eco 
nomic democracy.
Finally, buyouts and employee ownership appeal to those inter 
ested in expanding the economy and providing it with new engines 
of growth. As Louis Kelso asserts, opening up ownership may in 
crease the number of sources of capital. Furthermore, if employee 
ownership indeed is a key motivational tool, it may be useful for 
elevating general productivity.
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So far, we have attempted to introduce the issues relevant to job- 
saving through worker buyouts and to discuss even more briefly the 
role of QWL programs. In the following chapters, the story of the 
particular job-saving attempts, the issues in evaluating the success of 
the innovations, the methods we used to conduct our research, and 
our research results are treated much more thoroughly. First, in 
chapter 2 we present a theoretical framework for evaluating em 
ployee ownership and worker participation as job-saving strategies.
NOTES
1. Very recent and up-to-date summaries of this legislative history and references to the actual 
changes in the tax code, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986, can be found in Rosen (1987) 
and BNA (1987).
2. In 1987, the funding for technical assistance and professional services was reduced to 
$1/2 million per year, and the revolving loan fund received no allocation because the larger 
amounts of funding had not been used much in the previous three years. Some observers be 
lieve that the Pennsylvania Employee Ownership Assistance Program was not marketed aggres 
sively by the state government.
3. PACE worked on developing the initial legislation and the guidelines for the Pennsylvania 
Employee Ownership Assistance Program.
